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Abstract
The endogenous border formation model of Alesina and Spolaore
(1997) has received a lot of attention in the economics community.
One of its central messages is that in a democratic world in equilib-
rium there is an inefficiently large number of nation states. However,
this result is obtained under very specific assumptions like a uniform
population distribution and no population mobility. In this paper, I
generalize the model of Alesina and Spolaore allowing for population
distributions other than the uniform distribution. Since this gener-
alization is accompanied by the loss of tractability in closed form, I
calculate the equilibria by means of numerical computation. It turns
out that the above-mentioned central result is highly sensitive to the
choice of population distribution and that the model shows four differ-
ent regimes depending on the chosen distribution. Furthermore, the
behaviour implied by the Alesina and Spolaore model with uniform
population distribution is the exception, not the rule.
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1 Introduction
In the past century national borders have been redrawn to an enormous
extent. More than 140 of the currently existing 193 nation states1 have
emerged by gaining sovereignty since 1900. Obviously, dramatic political
events like the two World Wars, the collapse of the USSR and the decline
of colonialism were major driving forces in this process. Still, there is desire
for independence in many regions all around the world where people raise
their voice and aim for more independence either peacefully or by means
of force. Considering these developments, the assumption of a fixed nation
state as basic unit of (macro) economic analysis seems problematic.
Although these issues traditionally belong to the realm of disciplines
like (political) philosophy, history and political science, a recent economic
literature addresses questions regarding the process of political disintegra-
tion as well. The most prevalent of these approaches models national bor-
der formation dependent on a trade-off in the provision of public goods
[Alesina and Spolaore, 1997]. In this model, Alesina and Spolaore are able
to derive a number of very general statements concerning the formation
of nation states. However, these results are obtained under very specific
assumptions like a uniform population distribution, perfect correlation be-
tween an individual’s location and her preferences, and the exclusion of
population mobility. In the present paper I build on the work of the Alesina
and Spolaore model and try to generalize their work with regard to the
population distribution.
In the following section I present a short overview of the existing eco-
nomic literature on secession and integration with a special focus on the basic
model of Alesina and Spolaore (AS henceforth) and some of its extensions.
In Section 3 I introduce some generalizations into the framework regarding
the population distributions; the consequences of this modification will be
investigated in Sections 4 and 5. The last two sections of the paper focus on
the possible implications of the obtained results on the existing literature
and some speculations on promising future research directions.
2 Existing Literature
In the last twenty years political economists became more and more inter-
ested in exploring and modelling analytically several aspects of nation state
1I am aware of the conceptual shortcomings resulting from the lack of adequate defi-
nitions of terms like jurisdiction, nation, state and nation-state and their interchangeable
use in most of the relevant literature in political economics. In the context of interna-
tional relations, this point was made forcefully by Lars-Erik Cederman [Cederman, 1997,
p.17]. Further elaboration on this topic would justify an article on its own, but for the
purpose of this paper I will stick with the blurry use of these concepts and use these terms
interchangeably.
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formation. Bolton et al. [Bolton et al., 1996] provide a survey on the exist-
ing economic literature until the mid-1990s, Michele Ruta [Ruta, 2005] and
Enrico Spolaore [Spolaore, 2006] summarize recent advances in the field.
David Friedman [Friedman, 1977] was one of the first economists providing
an analytical answer to the question of the size of nations. In his model he
assumes a world of dictators that leads to a configuration of countries such
that the dictators’ joint revenue received from taxes on trade is maximized.
Bolton and Roland [Bolton and Roland, 1997] provide a model that allows
individuals to vote for unification and secession of nations, thus representing
an idealized democratic world. Their study concentrates on the influence of
regional income disparities and preferences over fiscal policy (i.e. redistribu-
tion policies) on the break-up of nations. However, the model assumes two
regions facing the possibility to unify as exogenously given.
A number of studies in the late 1990s are loosely based on Hotelling’s
location model [Hotelling, 1929]. In these models agents are uniformly dis-
tributed on a line and their position on this line represents their location
and/or preferences. Casella and Feinstein tackle the problem of political
(dis-)integration by employing a variation of Hotelling’s location model to
represent the voters’ heterogeneity of preferences over the provision of public
goods. Then they go on and investigate the relationship between the forma-
tion of markets and the formation of jurisdictions [Casella and Feinstein, 2002].
Donald Wittman presents a similar but comparably richer approach and
models the preferential and the spatial dimensions separately [Wittman, 2000].
His framework also includes a simple production function, which allows to
analyze the interactions between the polity and the market, as well as an
explicit formulation of coercion by means of an extortion function. These
additional mechanisms, however, force him to compare only the relative sizes
of two states.
The seminal work of Alesina and Spolaore [Alesina and Spolaore, 1997]
has probably received the most attention in this area so far. Also starting
from a location model loosely based on Hotelling’s approach they describe
the equilibrium number and sizes of jurisdictions endogenously. In the AS
model the size of a nation state is determined by a basic trade-off in the
provision of tax financed public goods. Larger nation states are able to
provide the public good (e.g. governmental services) at a lower per capita
cost. However, the larger the nation state the more difficult it is to satisfy
the demands of the more heterogeneous electorate by majority voting on the
location/type of the public good. In the AS model, individuals are uniformly
distributed on the segment [0, 1] representing the world. The world consists
of at least one country and each country has to provide a single public
good, its government, which is financed by taxes on its residents. In return,
these residents can take advantage of their country’s and only their country’s
public good. The resulting utility from the public good is decreasing linearly
with the distance between the individual and the government. For the sake
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of simplicity, it is assumed that in a given country every agent has to pay
the same amount of taxes.
A benevolent social planner who wishes to maximize the sum of all in-
dividuals’ utilities divides the world into N* countries, where the socially
optimal number of countries N* is given by
N∗ =
√
ga/4k. (1)
The socially optimal number of nation states is rising in the utility g gener-
ated by the public good and in the parameter a, which weights the utility
loss from distance to government. At the same time, N∗ is declining in the
cost k of the public good. Because of the assumption of a uniform popula-
tion distribution, all N∗ nations are of the same size and the social planner
locates each government in the middle of its country.2
However, the socially optimal number of nations N∗ does not coincide
with the stable number of nations in a democratic model world. In a world
without a benevolent social planner, individuals are allowed to decide on
national borders according to a number of straight forward behavioural rules.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the location of a country’s government is
decided by majority rule after the national borders are established. These
assumptions then lead to a democratic equilibrium number of nation states
N˜ given by
N˜ =
√
ga/2k. (2)
As in the social planner solution, in this equilibrium solution all nation
states are of the same size and each government is located in the middle of
its country (once again as a consequence of the uniform distribution).
To sum up, given a uniform population distribution the stable number
of nations in democratic equilibrium N˜ is always larger than the social op-
timum N∗, since √
ga/2k >
√
ga/4k. (3)
For any given value of g > 0, there are more jurisdictions in the democratic
equilibrium than in the social planner case.
Regarding the three central results of the AS model3, the proposition
that ”in equilibrium one generally observers an inefficiently large number of
countries” is of immediate relevance for my purpose and the only proposition
2For details regarding the derivation of this and the following results, the reader is
referred to [Alesina and Spolaore, 1997] or [Alesina and Spolaore, 2003].
3The three central results of the AS model are:
• ”democratization leads to secessions”
• ”in equilibrium one generally observes an inefficiently large number of countries”
• ”the equilibrium number of countries is increasing in the amount of economic inte-
gration.” [Alesina and Spolaore, 1997]
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that follows directly from the calculations above. The remaining two propo-
sitions will not be treated in this paper, although it cannot be ruled out that
they are affected as well by the consequences of the proposed extension to
the model.
The model presented above clearly is just a first crude attempt to grasp
the phenomenon under investigation. Several authors have tried to refine the
basic framework in one or another way. Klaas Staal [Staal, 2004] focuses on
making public spending and taxation4 exogenously dependent on the size of
the countries and confirms the results of Alesina and Spolaore. Federico Etro
[Etro, 2006] endogenously determines the size of public spending and derives
optimal solutions for the size of nations and their respective public spending
together. His conclusions are not unambiguously in favour of the original
AS results. Alesina and Spolaore [Alesina and Spolaore, 2006] extend the
model to investigate the role of international conflicts and defence spending
on the size and number of nations.
2.1 Shortcomings
The list of objections to the AS model in this section is by no means com-
plete but rather tries to emphasize some of the more pressing drawbacks.
Its originators are well aware of many of these shortcomings and give an
extensive roadmap for model improvement [Alesina and Spolaore, 2003, pp.
221-223].
The AS Model has been criticised for some of its rather strong assump-
tions which have been justified for reasons of mathematical tractability in
closed form. First, there is perfect correlation between the geographical lo-
cation and the individuals’ preferences, which in turn implies perfect sorting
of the population in terms of preferences. This simplification, however, rules
out the investigation of isolated minority groups. Empirical studies by East-
erly and Levine [Easterly and Levine, 2001] show a rather fractal income
distribution while Easterly and Levine [Easterly and Levine, 1997] as well
as Alesina et al. [Alesina et al., 2003] point out how ethnic, linguistic and
religious diversity affects economic growth of a country. So consideration of
the population distribution regarding attributes like income, ethnicity, and
language may well yield valuable insights.
Considerable objection was also raised against the idea of marginal bor-
der adjustment. The AS model lets an individual living at the border be-
tween two countries decide which jurisdiction it belongs to. Because there is
no population mobility, in such situations borders adjust marginally around
4In fact, the amount of tax each individual has to pay is already defined exogenously
dependent on the size of the respective country in the original AS model, since it is given
by the quotient of public good cost k over population size s. In the case of uniform
population distribution (as applied in the AS model), the population size coincides with
the territorial size of the country.
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the border individuals. In fact, howeer, border changes impose very high
fixed cost which in turn might be the most important reason why they occur
only in the way of discrete non-linear steps rather than infinitesimally small
ones. As Allan Drazen correctly notes,
[...] the marginalist approach may be sometimes relevant for
localities like cities or counties. They will make marginal adjust-
ments in their borders for purely economic reasons by absorb-
ing an unincorporated area or (more rarely) giving up a small
area to another city or county. At the national level, making
marginal adjustments for economic reasons, as opposed to polit-
ical or socio-ethnic reasons, does not seem especially descriptive
of reality. [Drazen, 2000, p. 727]
Additionally, the static approach to equilibrium analysis inherent in this
model poses questions on the methodological adequacy of the problem at
hand. Since state formation and secession are clearly dynamic long run
phenomena contingent on historical events, this theory is able to derive
conclusions only within a comparably stable and stylised context.
Another major point of criticism concerns the distribution of individ-
uals. In the AS model the population is distributed uniformly. A direct
consequence of this assumption is that in any given solution all countries
are of the same size - no matter which institutional setting is investigated
(dictatorship, democracy, benevolent social planner). Obviously this re-
sult doesn’t live up with a comparison against real world data. In fact,
country size in terms of population is distributed extremely asymmetrically
with relatively few large countries and a large number of very small nation
states. Various extensions to the basic AS model deal with openness and
international trade, conflict situations and possible power constellations in
economic and political supranational institutions. The assumption of a uni-
form population distribution, and therefore countries of equal size, seems
hard to justify considering these extensions. This paper is a first step in
analyzing the consequences of introducing jurisdictions of different size by
means of non-uniform population distributions.
3 Non-Uniform Population Distributions
In the basic AS model, the utility function of individual i residing in country
x is given by
Uix = g(1− alix) + y − tix, (4)
y denoting exogenous private income, lix representing the distance between
individual i’s location and the location of the government of country x and
tix measuring the amount of tax individual i has to pay to finance the
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government of country x. Since every inhabitant of country x has to pay
the same amount of tax, tix can be expressed by
tix = k/px, (5)
where px, the population size of country x, is given by
px = F (bx)− F (bx). (6)
F (.) is the cumulative distribution function of the population distribution
and bx (bx) denotes the upper (lower) border of country x on the [0, 1]-
segment. Note that in the case of the uniform distribution equation (6)
simplifies to px = bx − bx, which is the formal representation of the fact
that territorial size and population size of country x coincide in the basic
AS model.
Rewriting equation (4) in a more general way yields
Uix = g(1− a|i−mx|) + y − k/pix, (7)
where the distance lix is expressed explicitly as the absolute value of the
difference between the location of individual i (denoted simply as i) and the
location mx of the government of country x. While in democratic equilib-
rium mx is given by the median position of country x5, in the social planner
case mx is chosen to maximize total population utility. It can be shown,
however, that in this case the location of the government is given by the
median of country x (irrespective of the chosen population distribution) as
well. The median of country x is determined by
mx ≡ m(bx, bx) = F−1
(
1
2
(F (bx) + F (bx))
)
. (8)
F−1(.) is the inverse function of F (x), so that F−1(F (x)) = x. Assuming a
uniform population distribution, equation (8) simplifies to mx = 12(bx + b
x).
As the above elaborations already indicate, the introduction of a non-
uniform population distribution into the AS framework results in the loss of
tractability in closed form, mostly since this modification leads to the disso-
lution of identity between territorial size and population size of a country.
Because my method of investigation is numerical computation, any al-
ternative distribution has to offer comparably simple functional forms for
density function, distribution function, and median. Another desirable prop-
erty of the candidate distribution is versatility in terms of being capable of
representing a lot of different kinds of population density. In the ideal case,
these scenarios also contain the uniform distribution employed in the orig-
inal model in order to validate the obtained results against the existing
5This result is a direct consequence of the application of majority voting and makes
use of the Median Voter Theorem.
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work. These requirements limit the available range of functions seriously.
The Beta-distribution, which is a generalization of the uniform distribu-
tion, is out of the question due to its rather complicated form. So I turned
to a distribution suggested by Indian hydrologist Poondi Kumaraswamy
[Kumaraswamy, 1980] which is very similar to the Beta-distribution. This
double-bounded distribution takes the following form:
f(i; a, b) = abxa−1(1− xa)b−1 (9)
F (i; a, b) = 1− (1− xa)b (10)
The parameters a and b are shape parameters and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Setting a = 1
and b = 1 results in the uniform distribution. As can be seen in figure 1, this
distribution allows for a variety of different shapes apart from the uniform
distribution depending on the chosen shape parameters a and b. Choosing
similar values for a and b results in rather symmetric distributions; with
increasing difference between the values of the shape parameters, however,
asymmetric distributions arise.
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Figure 1: Density functions of Kumaraswamy’s double bounded distribution
for various sets of shape parameters
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3.1 The Social Planner Solution
Analytically, the problem of the social planner remains the same as in the
case with uniform population distribution. However, as already mentioned,
the introduction of non-uniformity results in the loss of a number of simpli-
fications and the problem is no longer solvable in closed form. Particularly,
the social planner problem, which is originally given by
max
∫ 1
0
Uidi
s.t.
∫ 1
0
tidi = Nk
turns to
max
∫ 1
0
Uif(i)di (11)
s.t.
∫ 1
0
tif(i)di = Nk. (12)
Since the population is no longer distributed uniformly, utility as well as
collected taxes in every location on the [0, 1]-segment have to be weighted
with the population size in this particular location, which is given by f(.), the
density function of the population distribution. Substitution of equations
(7) and (12) into (11) and reformulation of the problem yields
min
N,b1,...,bN ,b1,bN
Nk − y + g + ag
N∑
x=1
∫ bx
bx
|i−m(bx, bx)|f(i)di (13)
subject to bx = bx+1, b1 = 0 and bN = 1. Thus, the social planner prob-
lem is an optimization problem in the N dimensions N × b1 × ...× bN−1. I
bypass the loss of tractability in closed form by exhaustively searching the
space of possible configurations of nations (and locations of the public good
given by the resulting medians of the nations). This is done by varying
parameter g for a given set of the model parameters y, k, a and l and eval-
uating the configuration that maximizes total population utility. Because
this task is computationally very demanding, I am able to present results
for only a comparatively small range of parameter values. Nevertheless, this
is sufficient for detecting qualitative changes in the model behaviour.
Figure 2 shows the results of the calculations for parameter values y = 50,
a = 0.8, k = 8.0 and different values of g as a function of g.6 The solid
6The choice of parameter values may seem arbitrary, but since the high level of ab-
straction in this model renders empirical validation nearly impossible, this choice was
guided only by the requirement to generate solutions up to N = 5 in a comparatively low
range of parameter g. This, in turn, is a concession to run time issues resulting from the
computational complexity of the social planner solution. Variation of the parameters y, a
and k does not lead to qualitatively different behavior.
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Figure 2: The social planner solution N∗ dependent on public good utility
g for various population distributions
line represents the corresponding values of the uniform distribution, i.e.
K(1.0, 1.0)7. As can be seen, given a value of g the optimum solution leads
to more countries the smaller are the values of the shape parameters and
vice versa to a smaller number of countries for higher values of the shape
parameters a and b.
3.2 The Democratic Equilibrium
For the evaluation of democratic equilibria I calculate the stability conditions
for all possible configurations.8 A democratic equilibrium under RULE A
requires all individuals living at the border between two countries x and y
to be indifferent about which country to belong to or formally
liy − lix = k
ag
py − px
pxpy
(14)
7Henceforth, I will use the notation K(a, b) for Kumaraswamy’s double bounded dis-
tribution with shape parameters a and b.
8For this purpose, I employ the stability conditions of RULE A from the original AS
model. One might object that omitting calculation of the equilibria regarding RULE B
(internationally coordinated secessions and unifications) and RULE C (unilateral seces-
sions) weakens my argument. Since both the sets of equilibria under RULE B and under
RULE C, however, are subsets of all possible equilibria under RULE A by definition, all
results that follow are valid for equilibria under all three rules.
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for all N − 1 interior borders. In order to be a stable equilibrium as well,
small perturbations of this equilibrium (i.e. small border changes) must
not lead to a different outcome but instead the system has to converge to
the pre-shock equilibrium. Since the location of the public good is decided
by majority voting in each country, I can make use of the median voter
theorem and assume that each such public good is located at the position
of the median voter in each country.
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Figure 3: The democratic equilibrium solution N˜ for various population
distributions dependent on public good utility g
Figure 3 shows the results of the calculations with the same parameter
values as in Figure 2. No matter what values the shape parameters take,
it can be said that in general the stable number of nations is smaller than
in the uniform case (represented by the bold line once again). While the
deviations from the benchmark case with uniform distribution was rather
small regarding the optimum number of nations, the border stable equilib-
rium tends to react much stronger to changes in the underlying population
distribution.
4 Comparison Of Results
Given the high level of abstraction of the model, it would not be sensible
to derive quantitative conclusion. Nevertheless, the results allow for deci-
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sive qualitative conclusions when compared with another. In the following
graphs, I therefore compare the social planner solution and the democratic
equilibrium solution for the various population distributions investigated
above with the results of the original AS model. As will be seen, four dif-
ferent model behaviours can be sorted out.
4.1 Case 1: Confirmation of the AS model
Comparison of the case of (a, b) = (0.9, 0.9) yields a confirmation of the
results of the original AS model with uniform population distribution. This
rather minor deviation from the uniform case (a, b) = (1.0, 1.0) changes the
stable solution and the efficient solution only slightly, thereby not altering
the qualitative behaviour of the model. Still, the stable number of nations
is larger than the efficient number of nations for all values g > 0. A look at
figure 4 reveals the details.
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N∗a=0.9,b=0.9
Figure 4: Results of the uniform distribution compared with K(0.9, 0.9)
The general result is very similar to the case of the uniform distribution,
namely, that in equilibrium the stable number of nations is larger than
the socially optimal number of nations, i.e. there are too many nations in
equilibrium. But the extent of the difference between social planner solution
and border stable equilibrium is smaller. Nevertheless, this finding confirms
the stability of the results obtained by Alesina and Spolaore regarding minor
deviations from the uniform population distribution.
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4.2 Case 2: Ambiguous outcome with 1 intersection
The picture changes, however, when the shape parameters are altered a little
bit more. For the values (a, b) = (1.3, 1.2), the outcome is neither clearly in
favour nor strictly against the results derived from the original AS model.
As Figure 5 shows, the social planner solution intersects with the equilibrium
solution at about g = 350 and it depends on the exact value of parameter
g, whether the stable number of nations is larger than the efficient number
of nations or vice versa.
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N∗a=1.0,b=1.0
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Figure 5: Results of the uniform distribution compared with K(1.3, 1.2)
4.3 Case 3: Ambiguous outcome with 2 intersections
An even more puzzling outcome results for instance with shape parameters
(a, b) = (1.5, 1.7). As figure 6 shows, this time there is not only one intersec-
tion point, but there are two of them. Now, the basic result that the stable
number of nations is larger than the efficient number of nations is valid only
within a certain value range of parameter g. If g lies outside of this range,
then the results are reversed again.
4.4 Case 4: Complete rejection of the AS model
The final case I want to illustrate is the complete reversal of the AS results.
For certain values of the shape parameters, the efficient number of nations is
13
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Figure 6: Results of the uniform distribution compared with K(1.5, 1.7)
larger than the stable number of nations, thus contradicting the statement of
the AS model with uniform population distribution. As can be seen in figure
7, in the case of the K(1.5, 0.5)-distribution, the socially optimal number of
nations is larger than the stable number of nations, which contradicts the
basic message stated by the uniform case of the AS model.
These examples have clearly shown that the qualitative behaviour of this
framework crucially depends on the choice of the population distribution.
For shape parameter values close to 1, the same propositions obtain as in
the uniform case. However, by further deviating from the benchmark uni-
form case, the model changes its qualitative behaviour. We have seen that
in the cases of K(1.3, 1.2) and K(1.5, 1.7), no globally valid conclusions on
the relationship between the efficient solution and the stable solution can be
drawn. Finally, at shape parameter values a = 1.5 and b = 0.5 the propo-
sition derived from the uniform model is even reversed and in equilibrium
there are ”too few” nation states compared to the socially optimal case.
Until here, I have only shown a comparably small number of cases yield-
ing different results. To get the bigger picture of the dependence of model
behaviour on the choice of the population distribution, figure 8 shows the
outcomes for a great number of population distributions with shape pa-
rameters a and b ranging from 0.1 to 2.0. The point in parameter space
corresponding to the uniform population distribution (and therefore also
corresponding to the results of Alesina and Spolaore) is marked by the X
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Figure 7: Results of the uniform distribution compared with K(1.5, 0.5)
at (1, 1). As can be seen by the hollow circles, the predictions of the AS
model only hold in a very small surrounding area of the uniform population
distribution (case 1). For slightly larger deviations from the uniform case,
the model adapts a different behaviour characterized by the intersection of
the social planner solution and the stable solution (case 2). Going even
farther away from the center of the diagram, the model finally reverts its
behaviour in most of the investigated cases (marked by the hollow squares)
(case 4). An additional type of model behaviour can be found in the lower
left and the upper right region of the parameter space. The cases marked by
the triangle-signs characterize situations where the social planner solution
and the stable solution have two intersections (case 3). The general pattern
indicates that for asymmetrical distributions the results of the AS model are
negated, while in the case of rather symmetrical distributions the results are
conformed or - more oftenly - ambiguous outcomes occur.
While these results still represent a very selective view on possible pa-
rameter constellations, they suffice to show that the model behaviour is
highly sensitive to the chosen population distribution and serve as exis-
tence proof for outcomes completely different from the ones proposed by the
original AS-model with uniform population distribution. Especially the rel-
ative frequency of the four different regimes represents a strong result. The
overwhelming majority of population distributions points to model behavior
contrary to the insights of the AS model. Furthermore, the results of the AS
15
Figure 8: Model behavior for the state space of shape parameters a, b
model hold only within a narrow range of distributions close to the uniform
distribution.
5 Interpretation
What drives these results? Figures 2 and 3 have already shown that the
democratic equilibrium reacts much stronger to changes in the population
distribution than the social planner solution. As a means of illustration I
would like to give a specific example. Figure 9 presents the social planner
solution and the democratic solution for K(1.5, 0.5) and parameters y = 50,
a = 0.8, k = 8.0 and g = 400. As stated above, K(1.5, 0.5) belongs to the
behavioral regime of case 4, i.e. in equilibrium there are too few nations.
The borders which the social planner would decree are represented by the
dashed lines; the single interior border in the democratic case is represented
by the solid line. The diagram depicts the distribution function, thus on
the horizontal axis the borders indicate the territorial size of a country, on
the vertical axis they represent the population size. Given the parameters
stated above, the social planner would divide the world into three countries:
the leftmost country is populated sparsely, i.e. population size is much
smaller then territorial size. For the middle country population size and
territorial size are nearly equal; the rightmost encompasses nearly half of
the world population while occupying less then 20% of territorial space.
This solution, however, is not stable in a democratic world. In such a world
the individuals would create only two countries, a sparsely populated one
taking up two thirds of territorial space but encompassing only one third of
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Figure 9: An example of the democratic solution and the social planner
solution in the case of K(1.5, 0.5)
the world population and a densely populated one accounting for one third
of territorial space and two thirds of world population.
The logic behind the individuals’ desire to create fewer countries than
the social planner would decree, however, is the same as in the original AS
model, only the direction of effect is reversed. Starting at the social planner
solution, the individual next to the left border of the densely populated
country to the right would prefer to be part of this country rather than
the country in the middle since distance to the government is much smaller
in the rightmost country. Additionally, the per capita cost of public good
provision is much lower there because of the high population density. The
individual’s choice for the right country even increases the benefits of being
a citizen of that country because per capita costs are reduced by a higher
amount than the utility losses from distance to government. For the same
reasons the next individuals would choose the right rather than the middle
country as well until the gain from decreased per capita costs equals the
utility losses from distance to government. Similar reasoning applies to
the border between the left and the middle country. Making public good
utility g endogenously dependent on taxes collected - instead of treating it
as constant - as proposed by Klaas Staal [Staal, 2004] even amplifies this
process.
In the remaining part of this article I will elaborate on the implications
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of the lack of robustness of the AS model and propose a different approach
to the issue.
6 Implications
As has been shown above, the results derived from the AS framework are
strictly dependent on the choice of the distribution. So it is fair to say that
this model is not robust to variations of some of its assumptions.
Clearly, the results derived from the uniform distribution case make some
sense. If, for instance, you take a look at the many small nation states with
a population size less than one million people, it seems plausible that they
are operating at an inefficiently low scale. Furthermore, if you consider that
some of these small nations are still subject to secession ambitions, therefore
potentially leading to even smaller states - as documented by the efforts of
Curacao or St. Martin to become independent9 - the prediction of the AS
model that in equilibrium there are more nation states than in the social
optimum seems like an accurate description of some real world processes.
These results are derived, however, under very strict and artificial as-
sumptions. Especially the uniform size distribution of nation states seems
troublesome because it leads to results with nation states of equal size which
obviously contradicts the highly asymmetrical size distribution of countries
- whether measured in population size or in territorial size. Though, by
relaxing the assumptions regarding the population distribution and there-
fore allowing for states of different sizes, the proposition holds only within a
very limited range of distributions for shape parameters close to the uniform
case. In the vast majority of cases, the model behaviour is ambiguous or
even opposed to the results of the original model.
Considering the extensions of the AS model that are concerned with
international conflict [Alesina and Spolaore, 2006] or the formation of inter-
national federations [Alesina et al., 2005], the question at hand is, whether
not incorporating heterogeneous state sizes is a valid simplification for cap-
turing the driving forces of these phenomena. I doubt the validity of this
abstraction for both issues are determined by the interaction patterns of a
few very large actors and a majority of comparably small ones. Negotiations
within international federations and conflict situations rarely take place on
equal terms with regard to bargaining power. The neglect of this asymmetry
clearly limits the explanatory power of the AS model regarding the descrip-
tion and understanding of international political dynamics. Most if not all
models in the tradition of the AS approach assume a uniform population
distribution for mathematical convenience. It seems likely that the obtained
results are dependent on this simplifying assumption as well, although these
models haven’t been tested yet.
9The Economist, May 26th 2007, p. 58
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Additionally, empirical investigation is of high importance in order to
single out those forms of distributions that prevail in reality. Thereafter,
validation or falsification of the obtained results would be possible. Given
the high abstraction level of this framework, however, it seems hard to come
up with a sound empirical strategy. Above all it is not clear how empirical
data could be transformed to one-dimensional distance measures as used in
the AS model.
7 Conclusion
Without a doubt, the AS model serves as a starting point for a better under-
standing of the complex issues at hand, but as in the present paper I tried
to show, there is still much research to do in order to grasp them in a more
adequate way. While the treatment at hand represents a first generalization
of the underlying distribution assumptions that allows for nation states of
different sizes, more realistic multimodal population distributions are still
missing in the picture. Non-linear modelling approaches like agent based
modelling (ABM) seem to be the method of choice in this case. Not only
would ABM allow for more flexibility regarding population distributions,
but other drawbacks of the AS model (e.g. absence of population mobility,
perfect correlation between preferences and location) could be tackled as
well.
In my opinion a comparative static approach with marginal border ad-
justments cannot do justice to the issue of secession and unification. Border
changes happen in discrete non-linear steps and are subject to a number of
dynamic influences, path dependencies, and the like. It is to be doubted if
a static mathematical model driven by the self-interested decisions of single
individuals is the right method to tackle this collective problem. ABM, on
the other hand, allows for the formulation of the issues by means of complex
adaptive systems. These systems are able to exhibit non-linearities as well as
path-dependent behaviour which I believe to be relevant elements in the con-
text of this topic. Lars-Erik Cederman’s agent based models, for instance,
seem particularly promising [Cederman, 1997]. He develops a number of
non-equilibrium models on the emergence of states and nations by employ-
ing this method which resulted in a number of valuable insights. However,
like most work originating in the political sciences, he neglects the interplay
between politics and economics in the process of secession and unification
and reduces the agents’ motivation to conquest. On the other hand, existing
work in the economics literature focuses primarily on economic issues like
public good provision and tax collection.
It is my belief that neither of these approaches is fully capable of handling
the issues tackled in this paper. In fact, I believe that interdisciplinary
social science research is necessary to gain deeper insights in many hot issues
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related to the problem. The role of the nation state in a unified Europe and
a globalized world, the ongoing trend for secessions in many parts of the
world, and the challenges of so-called failed states show impressively that
there is a pressing need for theories which can substantially improve our
knowledge about the role of the nation state in the international political
economy.
Clearly, the presented results are just a first step. Nevertheless, I think
that the work on this topic so far deserves further investigation in many
directions, since the central insights of Alesina and Spolaore have turned
into common sense among many economists. Yet, as the treatment at hand
has shown, their results are heavily dependent on the appropriate choice of
distribution function and valid only in the minority of cases. In the face
of the many problems related to the role of the nation state it would be
urgent to put forward a new and improved theory that manages to integrate
political, economic and cultural factors that accompany the issue of secession
and unification.
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